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ABSTRACT 
The paper dissects the intricacies of Automated Decision Making 
(ADM) and urges for refining the current legal definition of AI 
when pinpointing the role of algorithms in the advent of ubiquitous 
computing, data analytics and deep learning. ADM relies upon a 
plethora of algorithmic approaches and has already found a wide 
range of applications in marketing automation, social networks, 
computational neuroscience, robotics, and other fields. Our main 
aim here is to explain how a thorough understanding of the layers 
of ADM could be a first good step towards this direction: AI 
operates on a formula based on several degrees of automation 
employed in the interaction between the programmer, the user, and 
the algorithm; this can take various shapes and thus yield different 
answers to key issues regarding agency. The paper offers a fresh 
look at the concept of “Machine Intelligence”, which exposes 
certain vulnerabilities in its current legal interpretation. Most 
importantly, it further helps us to explore whether the argument for 
“artificial personhood” holds any water. To highlight this 
argument, analysis proceeds in two parts: Part 1 strives to provide 
a taxonomy of the various levels of automation that reflects distinct 
degrees of Human – Machine interaction and can thus serve as a 
point of reference for outlining distinct rights and obligations of the 
programmer and the consumer: driverless cars are used as a case 
study to explore the several layers of human and machine 
interaction. These different degrees of automation reflect various 
levels of complexities in the underlying algorithms, and pose very 
interesting questions in terms of agency and dynamic tasks carried 
out by software agents. Part 2 further discusses the intricate nature 
of the underlying algorithms and artificial neural networks (ANN) 
that implement them and considers how one can interpret and 
utilize observed patterns in acquired data. Is “artificial personhood” 
a sufficient legal response to highly sophisticated machine learning 
techniques employed in decision making that successfully emulate 
or even enhance human cognitive abilities? 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The great advances that have occurred in machine learning 
research in the past four decades have led to a rapid 
commercialization of AI assisted systems, whose applications are 
nowadays indispensable parts of one’s everyday life: Virtual 
Personal Assistants like Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana, 
driverless cars and smart thermostats are only a few examples to a 
rapidly expanding list. An important component of these 
applications is Automated Decision Making (ADM), that is, the 
ability of algorithms to provide solutions in tasks with ambiguous 
outcomes and determine the optimal among a set of possible 
answers. In light of these developments, this paper attempts to 
provide an overview of the various layers of algorithmic 
determinism in automated and semi-automated tasks. Our hope is 
that this analysis could serve as a useful point of reference for 
assessing the frequently suggested arguments towards a potential 
legal personification of software agents.  
 In 2016, Microsoft released an artificial application into the 
online social sphere: a ChatBot called Tay.ai, which was designed 
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to interact with Twitter users and learn from these interactions. 
Within 24 hours, Microsoft had to deactivate Tay’s Twitter 
account, due to a large amount of retweets of racism comments on 
Tay’s feed, often including further offensive commentary by the 
ChatBot (Perez 2016). Although such racial commentary is not 
unusual online (Williams et al, 2016), the case of Tay is of 
particular interest given that it provides empirical evidence of 
advanced forms of AI that is able to mimic human behavior. This 
interaction between the machine and the human is an intricate 
process that includes various degrees of automation, which in turn 
result from mixing together the user feedback with the algorithm’s 
behavior.   
This of course opens the door to a plethora of ethical and safety 
considerations with regards to using AI technologies without 
abusing the power these might yield over human agents. When the 
AI research firm DeepMind was acquired by Google in 2014, one 
of the prerequisites was to set up an ethics board dealing with these 
issues. After all, the recent win of the company’s system AlphaGo 
over a high level human player proves the need for a code of ethics. 
Lately however, further concerns have also been voiced as to the 
legal and ethical treatment of advanced AI applications that 
effectively require limited supervision or are even able to operate 
without the need for “the human in the loop”.  Indicative of the 
latter is the EU Legal Affairs Committee’s vote for a resolution in 
January 2017, which calls for a detailed legislative framework 
regarding smart autonomous systems. Among other points, the 
proposal urges for a wider definition of AI, including smart systems 
either comprised a physical support or connected to a software 
program without being embedded in a physical support. Largely 
based at a draft report prepared by MEP Mady Delvaux in 2016, it 
is expected to further discuss the prospect of considering rendering 
a “specific legal status” for robots. As noted in the report, "At least 
the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as 
having the status of electronic persons with specific rights and 
obligations, including that of making good any damage they may 
cause". Thus, an electronic personality could also be applied "to 
cases where robots make smart autonomous decisions or otherwise 
interact with third parties independently". The purpose of this paper 
is to discuss this proposition in further detail and assess its validity: 
are we ready to introduce “hybrid” personhood rights?  
The question of how real and simulated intelligence measure up 
in AI is hardly a new one (for a good overview see Haugeland 
1985). Note for example Chomsky’s reading of the Alan Turing test 
(Turing 1950) as an approach that separates the cognitive from the 
biological elements in order to provide an answer as to whether 
machines can be perceived by humans as able to think, not different 
to fooling someone into believing the “submarines can swim” 
(Chomsky, 1996). This, Chomsky concludes, is a “question of 
decision, not a question of fact”, not different to fooling someone 
into believing the “submarines can swim”.   
This interpretation of “intelligence” lies at the heart of the 
argument put forth here: to legally assess Automated Decision 
Making, one needs to go beyond the realm of biological and 
cognitive abilities and consider the essence of the concept of 
“personhood”: what defines a person and when is a person 
autonomous? In other words, the level of autonomy displayed by 
the agent or the machine will also determine the level of liability, 
which is currently a puzzling notion for legal scholars addressing 
AI. To highlight this point, the paper uses driverless cars as a case 
study and explains how fully automated systems bestow upon us 
the task to develop our theorizing in order to accommodate artificial 
agents within legal doctrines. As it will be shown in the remainder 
of the paper, the matter of “intelligence” in AI is not merely of 
philosophical nature but its definition is much needed to provide 
solid grounding for emergent legal issues, such as tortious liability 
(Chopra & White, 2011). The latter is of course a legal convention, 
which provides us with a safe tool to address challenging issues in 
automated systems (i.e. liability in driverless cars) but is not on its 
own enough to account for the reconfiguration of key concepts, 
such as causation and responsibility.   
Moving away from Chomsky’s narrow interpretation of the 
Turing test, Russell and Norvig (2003) draw an interesting 
distinction between an artefact’s behavior and an artefacts 
pedigree: "we can conclude that in some cases, the behavior of an 
artefact is important, while in others it is the artefact’s pedigree that 
matters. Which one is important in which case seems to be a matter 
of convention. But for artificial minds, there is no convention". This 
explains the focal point of this paper, which revolves around the 
personhood of artificial agents. As such, our aim here is to go 
beyond the mere confinements of torts and contracts and to canvass 
a rights-based framework for highly sophisticated machine learning 
algorithms employed in ADM. As it will be shown next, although 
to a certain extent we do not lack the legal tools to address issues 
of liability in automated systems, deep learning has added two extra 
parameters to the equation that have complicated matters:  
  
(i) The pedigree of the artefact is the result of an opaque 
computational procedure to resemble human cognitive behavior 
that is dynamic and evolving. Of course, automated systems as such 
are hardly a novelty: take for example the UAV (unmanned aerial 
vehicles), which have been in use since 1900s in military training. 
The novelty here is that –unlike UAVs- the human involvement is 
now from within the “black box”: a driverless vehicle does not lack 
a driver but it is rather the driver that is not required to be fully 
alerted or to participate at all times.  
  
(ii) The behavior of the artefact is the result of a combination of 
several layers of interaction between the human and the artificial 
agent. Again, the intricate part here is not the interaction with the 
machine as such; for more than fifty years now, Brain Computer 
Interface (BCI) research has been considering the applications of 
such a symbiotic relationship in areas, such as neuro-prosthetics. 
But what is striking here, is that the technological advancements in 
Machine Learning have uncovered various degrees of interaction 
between the man and the machine, which at times can be hard to 
identify and rationalize.    
 
To elucidate such intricacies, the following section provides an 
overview of ADM and its mechanics, namely some related machine 
learning algorithms and the current trend towards deep learning. 
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2 A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF 
EMERGENT NORMATIVE AND LEGAL 
ASPECTS IN AUTOMATED SYSTEMS: THE 
INTRICACIES OF MACHINE LEARNING 
ALGORITHMS 
 
The aim of this section is to first establish an understanding of 
the technical context, within which ADM occurs. This will not only 
allow us to explain better how a definition of “intelligence” in AI 
(pedigree) is somewhat elusive but it will also provide a solid 
methodological grounding, given that the approach taken here is a 
techno-legal overview of automated systems. Recent advances in 
machine learning and computational complexity theory have been 
further boosted by the ability to collect, manipulate and store vast 
amounts of data. ADM is a natural product of these exciting 
developments and has found a wide range of applications in 
seemingly unrelated fields like marketing automation, social 
networks, computational neuroscience, robotics, banking, 
transportation and others. 
      Machine learning algorithms often employ artificial neural 
networks (ANNs). This means that the computational units these 
algorithms use to perform intelligent functions resemble biological 
networks and neurons. ANNs take advantage of powerful 
algorithms that are trained using large datasets available in many 
industries (image databases, security or healthcare records, traffic 
or consumer behavior data, online platform analytics, etc.) so that 
they can correctly decide upon suitable actions when new data are 
presented to them in a similar way to what a human agent would 
do; for example to recognize faces or operate driverless cars. The 
purpose of ADM is to be able to act without the need of human 
intervention. They are be able to deal with novel conditions, that is 
take the right decision even when the dataset presented to them is 
different from the one they have been trained on, e.g. a driverless 
car should be able to navigate in a road it has not had access before. 
How do ANN algorithms learn to perform complicated tasks 
efficiently? Put simply, the answer lies in exploiting both increased 
computational power and vast amounts of data already collected. 
This data is used by the programmer to train the algorithm. 
Technically, training is often done in one of the following three 
ways: supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning, see e.g. 
(Mohri et al., 2012). These are technical terms that relate to  the 
details of the training process and  are distinct from potential 
interactions with the user after the algorithm is passed on to her in 
e.g. human-in-the-loop and similar applications.  
Supervised learning (SL) occurs when during training the 
algorithm is fed with both an input and the correct decision 
(output). For example, when the algorithm has to distinguish 
between faces and objects in a scene, the input would be an image 
and the output a class index, e.g. 1 for faces and 2 for objects. The 
algorithm is then given pairs of images and class indices that are 
used to fine tune its parameters. The algorithm has to find the 
correct class index when – after learning- it is presented with a new 
image that may or may not contain a face (Nakajima et al, 2000).  
Unsupervised learning (UL) is quite similar conceptually. Using 
the above simple example, the difference is that the algorithm 
would have to guess whether the image contains a face or not 
without being explicitly given the corresponding indices during the 
training process (Kumar et al., 2010). Of course, when designed, 
the algorithm is fed with some information about the task, e.g. it 
would know it should decide between two possible alternatives, 
however it is not given which images contain faces and which do 
not, it has to discover these differences based on certain features 
that the images might contain, e.g. eyes, nose and mouth at close 
proximity in all images that contain faces. In a more difficult 
scenario, the algorithm might even have to decide how many 
classes or categories there might be in the data, something that 
might lead to it over- or under-estimating this number. In such 
clustering or classification tasks the algorithm puts together points 
that are related in some conceptual space. Of course, the 
dimensions of this space (which features should be selected) are 
crucial for making the algorithm efficient and are chosen by the 
programmer in the design stage. This is important as it might 
introduce a bias in the output of the decision process: depending on 
what features the programmer chooses to be important, the 
algorithm might take different decisions. We call this the “bias” 
introduced by the programmer to the ADM algorithm. The reader 
should keep this term in mind as we will come back to it in section 
4.2 below. Bias is not only an issue in unsupervised learning but 
also in other machine learning approaches like Reinforcement 
Learning to which we now turn:  
Reinforcement learning (RL) is slightly more complicated: it 
decouples actions from rewards and the algorithm aims not at 
taking the “right” action (decision), but maximizing the reward it 
receives (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is merely a technical 
distinction that renders the description of the relevant algorithms 
slightly more complicated – for example, the algorithm might have 
to take several actions one after the other to maximize an end goal 
(reward). Interestingly, this decoupling speaks to the ability of the 
algorithm to take sequential decisions that are related to each other 
and think ahead in time; for example, the DeepMind algorithm that 
plays the Atari game Breakout should find a balance between the 
time it spends at each location firing and the speed it moves if it 
wants to accumulate sufficient reward (high score) and successfully 
proceed to the next level (Mnih et al., 2015). Furthermore, this 
balance might change in time or as the level of the game advances. 
Contrary to the other two approaches, the emphasis in RL is in 
combining several decisions (or actions) to get the most benefit out 
of them. In other words, reward is a complicated function of two or 
more decisions that might be unknown even to the programmer, let 
alone the user herself.  
RL is today considered to be a promising avenue for building 
intelligent algorithms that can adapt to different environments and 
even tasks; an important limitation in older machine learning 
approaches was the lack of flexibility: e.g. an algorithm might learn 
to play chess at master level but would be unable to play checkers, 
which for most human players that know the rules chess would be 
easy to pick up. This is why algorithms are often trained to perform 
within a limited set of conditions and cannot succeed when rules 
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changes, even slightly. In a paper published last year, DeepMind 
researchers showed that the same algorithm could perform well in 
several Atari games without being trained in each one individually 
(Minh et al., 2015) Essentially, the algorithm learns different 
mappings between actions and rewards online and is able to 
flexibly maximize the benefit it receives when the environment 
(game) changes.  
All three learning approaches have a long history in machine 
learning, however recent successes like the DeepMind algorithm 
for playing Atari games discussed above followed technical 
advances sometimes referred to collectively as Deep Learning 
(DL). For example, the DeepMind work uses Deep-Q Learning 
which is a combination of RL and DL (Van Hasselt et al., 2015). 
Roughly speaking, the term “Deep” here refers to increasing the 
power (and complexity) of an algorithm by taking its basic 
constituent parts and using them recursively, that is feeding the 
output of one part to the other. Crucially, each part uses a similar 
learning process, however only after combining all parts together is 
the system (building a deep architecture) able to perform well. If 
the architecture of the algorithm is changed, e.g. a smaller number 
of constituent parts are used, then the algorithm might not be able 
to take the right decision of find the action that maximize its reward.  
Architectural details like e.g. the exact number of parts (layers) 
in the system or how “big” each part should be in terms of how 
many computational units should be used are often found by 
experience. This is in contrast with older approaches and rule-based 
simulations where the algorithms were implemented in much 
smaller computer infrastructures and the role of different 
computational elements involved was more transparent. 
Interestingly, it might not be a principled explanation as to why 
certain deep (extended) architectures work and others don’t 
something often referred to as the deep algorithms being somehow 
“opaque”. This idea has its roots in neuroscience where a 
succession of brain areas – e.g. the ventral system- plays a similar 
role to a deep network architecture. In this setting, certain brain 
areas situated away from sensory regions light up and respond to 
different stimuli e.g. some areas respond to faces and others to 
objects. This means that these areas are sensitive to the category of 
the visual stimuli and can distinguish between categories. 
Crucially, earlier (visual) areas would respond to anything placed 
in the visual field regardless of its category. However, only higher 
areas that receive input from several upstream regions are able to 
distinguish between different categories of visual stimuli. In brief, 
the brain decides about the category of the stimulus by combining 
signals from several areas that interact in a large network. 
Similarly, it is only after the programmer endows its algorithm with 
several parts and builds a “deep” hierarchical architecture that the 
algorithm can distinguish between classes of visual stimuli. 
 So what have we lost by making the algorithm deep? Maybe 
we have found a way to replace humans with intelligent agents that 
can perform well and take the right decisions; however, we cannot 
claim that the algorithm really understands or interprets its input 
the way a human would do. This poses an interesting challenge for 
law, and in particular regarding the concept of “agency”, as deep 
algorithms have the ability to act upon their input, e. g. take a 
decision. In this case, the definition of “act” is stretched beyond the 
narrow confinements of conventional legal formalism; algorithms 
do not serve as mere tools but are able to take well informed 
decisions under little or no supervision at all.   
Most importantly, there exists an additional dimension that 
further muddles the waters for legally assessing ADM: what is the 
scope for the user’s involvement in the decision process? Given the 
complexity in the process of decision making, a clear understanding 
of the interactions between the machine and the human agent is 
necessary not only for attributing responsibility for the outcome of 
the decision met but further to explore the causality, intent and risk 
assessment. Take for example the law of negligence, a tort 
introduced partly in response to the problems of agency: direct 
liability would only apply in supervised systems, whereas indirect 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior would require a 
certain level of foreseeability, namely “normalized expectations for 
the technical capacities of computer action” (Teubner, 2007).   
In applications that require a human-in-the-loop like Brain 
Computer Interface (BCI), assisted Decision Making and Health 
Informatics the user already plays an active role in this process. In 
such cases, the user acts supplementary to the algorithm and 
interacts with it. This leads to increased performance and efficiency 
of the algorithm and good performance even in situations of high 
uncertainty or increased risk. What makes human-in-the-loop 
algorithms different to autonomous systems is not the way training 
is carried out but the possibility of human intervention at 
intermediate stages of the training process. The human intervenes 
to enhance the algorithm’s performance by bringing in knowledge 
the algorithm has no access to. Intermediate training follows the 
general procedures we have described above  but the user has a 
decisive role in selecting new training datasets that have been 
preprocessed by her, e.g. throw irrelevant parts  away or intervene 
at intermediate stages to  assess the quality of results produced  and 
guide  the algorithm accordingly. For example, in (Awasthi et 
al.,2015) an algorithm used limited supervision to cluster data in a 
certain number of groups with the help of the user who  at each 
stage told the algorithm whether it should split or merge some of it.  
Thus far we have discussed the technical details underlying 
machine learning algorithms used in ADM. These summarize what 
we earlier called the artefact’s pedigree.  In the following section, 
we focus on the artefact’s behavior and use driverless cars as a case 
study to explore the various levels of automation: this allows us to 
gain a better understanding of various degrees of human-machine 
interaction, which will serve as a reference point for the remainder 
of the paper and shall aid us in our quest to understand the balance 
between the algorithm’s inner workings – that are often opaque – 
and human intervention. 
 3 A TAXONOMY OF AUTOMATION 
LAYERS: DRIVERLESS CARS AS A CASE 
STUDY 
 
The prospect of fully autonomous vehicles “designed to be 
capable of safely competing journeys without the need for a driver” 
(Department for Transport Code of Practice) has certainly gained 
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momentum in the past few years: Google Chauffeur software 
currently tested in autonomous vehicles in California, Rio Tinto’s 
autonomous haulage systems operating since 2008 in Australia or 
Volvo’s pioneering program “Drive me” expected to release 
autonomous vehicles to customers in Gothenburg by 2017 are a few 
indicative cases of the great potential automated systems have 
shown in the transport industry (Atkins 2015). This however is far 
from removing drivers completely “off the loop”, although many 
manufacturers have already introduced semi-automated vehicles 
with driving assistance features, such as controlling the brake, 
throttle and steering, supporting active lane-keeping or using 
sensors to deliver full speed adaptive cruise control (KPMG 2013).   
It is thus apparent that automated systems, such as autonomous 
vehicles, operate on several different degrees of automation, 
according to how much control is yielded to the driver. In other 
words, the novel element here is not automation per se but the 
variety of degrees of interaction between the man and the machine. 
Take for example the case study of driverless cars explored here:  
automated driving is not really a striking fact nowadays; the auto-
mobile started replacing the horse-drawn carriages in the turn of the 
20th century. The initial skepticism towards the new risks posed by 
the technological advances was followed by gradual adoption of the 
new means of transport, mainly due to the codification of 
automated driving in law (Moris, 2007). Transport related legal 
issues, mainly liability, have been dealt with a dynamic body of 
regulations at a national and international level, which have taken 
an anthropocentric view: assumption of risk, bad judgement, and 
reasonable foreseeability, are a few grounds upon which causality 
can be established. At the same time, they all have one common 
point of departure: human error as a sine qua non of the decision 
making process.   
 The elimination of human error is however also one of the key 
elements behind the rapid evolution of the self-driving car industry. 
A 2008 NHTSA report attributes 40% of collisions to “recognition 
errors”, caused by distractions, and 35% to “decision errors”, such 
as speeding. It is thus expected that removing the human element 
from driving will enhance road safety (NHTSA, 2008). Recent 
progress in computer vision like the use of massively parallel 
graphic processing units and deep learning algorithms have led to 
a revolution in the field of driverless cars. The quest for self-driving 
vehicles was initiated with DARPA’s Grand Challenges: this was a 
competition among such vehicles where external operators were 
allowed to intervene in the vehicles’ route to minimize risk and 
ensure safety (e.g. by stopping and restarting the vehicles). Since 
then, several milestones have been reached and fully autonomous 
driving has become a reality (Urmson et al., 2008; Levinson et al., 
2011; 2014; Wei et al., 2013). Of course, due to the complexity and 
breadth of possible driving conditions, achieving fully autonomous 
cars that  have sufficient training so that they are able to perform 
well in any situation is far from solved (despite using huge training 
datasets, that include millions of highway and road images etc.). 
However, extending basic computer vision algorithms to the level 
of replacing human agents is now considered viable and several 
reports of self-driving cars have appeared in the media, e.g. (Rosen, 
R.,2012; Hull, L., 2013).  
Thus, it is not the technology or the externalities it unavoidably 
creates that hinder our legal understanding of automated decision 
making. What is challenging for legal minds, is an unprecedented 
variety of interfaces and levels of interaction between the human 
and a machine learning algorithm. To put it differently, to fully 
assess  these algorithms one will have to perceive to what extent 
the human element (directly by human-in the-loop interventions or 
indirectly at the design stage) is present in the “intelligence” 
demonstrated by the algorithm. As noted in section 2 above, it is 
imperative that a basic taxonomy for ADM is adopted prior to any 
legal evaluation to enhance our understanding of how each 
“automated” task involves constant shifts of roles from executing 
to merely supervising (Sheridan 1970).   
The study of these interactions has given rise to many theories 
discussing ontological and deontological approaches regarding 
automated functions and the degree of human involvement (Fitts 
1951). As a result, many taxonomies of various degrees of 
automation have been suggested in a quest to localize informational 
control in the human or automaton domain: Sheridan and 
Verplank’s ten degrees of automation (1978) are probably the most 
widely adopted theory that describes variations of control from 
human to collaborative and to fully automated, Endsley and 
Kaber’s theory (1999) emphasizes on supported, blended or 
automated decision making, whereas Riley’s taxonomy (1989) uses 
a mixed assessment based on various levels of autonomy that 
intersect with different degrees of intelligence. These theories have 
provided the ground for authorities such as the NHTSA or the 
Society of Automobile Engineers to identify 5 levels of automation 
in computer assisted driving:    
  
(i) No-Automation (Level 0), i.e. the system automatically 
assists the driver to regain lost control of the vehicle.  
(ii)  Function-specific Automation (Level 1), i.e. the system 
controls one function.   
(iii) Combined Function Automation (Level 2), i.e. the system 
controls at least two functions.  
(iv) Limited Self-Driving Automation (Level 3), i.e. the driver 
cedes full control under specific conditions,   
(v) Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4), i.e. the driver is 
not expected to become involved throughout the duration 
of the trip.  
 
Further to this, the NHTSA Federal Automated Vehicles Policy 
published in September 2016 by the US Department of 
Transportation, outlines in more detail the term “highly automated 
vehicle” (HAV), which represents SAE Levels 3-5 vehicles with 
automated systems that are responsible for monitoring the driving 
environment. This variety of human – machine interaction 
introduces a new complexity: “the vehicle must be capable of 
accurately conveying information to the human driver regarding 
intentions and vehicle performance”, as well as to its environment, 
namely “other external actors with whom the HAV may have 
interactions (other vehicles, pedestrians, etc.)”. To put this 
differently, it does matter whether the average observer can tell 
whether a vehicle is autonomous or not, as this changes the degree 
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of reliance towards the ability of a driver to maneuver and shapes 
reasonable expectations accordingly. This is particularly interesting 
when one considers Level 3 SAE systems, which are expected to 
be monitored by the driver, although human capacity to stay alert 
when disengaged from the driving task may be limited.   
Driverless cars are a recent example where automated systems 
have made great progress and reached a level, where the operator 
can be completely ignored. Earlier examples include aviation 
(Spizer, 1987) and medicine (Thompson, 1994), leading up to the 
emergence of the DoNotPay Bot in 2016, the world’s first “robot 
lawyer”, offering free legal advice to the homeless. We have chosen 
to discuss driverless cars in the paper, as the various degrees of 
automation discussed above, capture perfectly this interplay 
between the operator and the agent. As Sheridan notes “Automation 
has moved from open-loop mechanization of industrial revolution, 
then to simple closed loop linear control, then to non-linear and 
adaptive control and recently to a mic of crisp and fuzzy rule-based 
decision, neural nets and generic algorithms that truly recognize 
patterns and learn” (Sheridan 2000). This in turn has also marked a 
shift from automated ML (aML) to interactive ML (iML) 
(Holzinger, 2016), namely an almost seamless interaction between 
the machine and the operator. The more sophisticated the system 
is, the more it changes the nature of human performance, 
challenging thereby our understanding of who the operator of a 
given task is, and to what extent she needs to apply own cognitive 
capacities (Parasuraman, 1997). From a legal standpoint, this is 
highly problematic as such interactions lend anthropomorphic traits 
to otherwise automatically executed tasks. In a similar vein, Calo 
(2015) outlines three distinctive features in robotics that blend the 
boundaries between the human and the machine: embodiment of 
the algorithm (e.g. the car in our case study), emergence (the 
“coupling of complexity and usefulness”) and social valence, 
namely the public reliance on automated systems. Ultimately, he 
concludes that new juridical insights will be required to fully 
perceive this emerging field from a legal viewpoint and accurately 
evaluate to what extend automated systems can be treated as social 
actors, able to “think” for us  after having benefited from our social 
experiences. This echoes Teubner (2007), who having reviewed 
Luhmann and Latour, explains how most legal actors are created 
by social attribution, without the need to possess any ontological 
human properties, such as reflexive capacities or empathy. That 
said, artificial agents are still beyond the narrow confinements of 
our current anthropocentric view of legal actors.    
Can autonomous cars drive us, in the same sense that 
submarines can swim? So far we have focused on how advances in 
machine learning have led to highly sophisticated automated 
systems that can potentially throw the operator out-of-the-loop. To 
understand this better, let us take the Google driverless car as an 
example and focus on how it can operate with minimal supervision. 
The Google algorithm for driverless cars performs the following   
operations:  
(i) self-localization using 3D map technologies  
(ii) determination of static and moving obstacles  
(iii) classification of information/objects by using machine vision  
(iv) generation of road condition predictions  
(v) evaluation of these predictions against real circumstances  
(vi) automated actions like steering, braking or accelerating, if 
required (Titiriga, 2016).  
These are the same operations a human driver would have to 
undertake; however the sense of agency is in this case different: 
what do notions like “average reasonable person”, “free will”, 
“mens rea” and degrees of culpability mean in the case of driverless 
cars? Such questions present us with an “indirect agency”, a status 
which is not easy to assess legally using frequently evoked criteria.  
Let us then consider each of the above steps independently: in 
operations (ii) and (iii) the algorithm has to perform image and 
object recognition, segmentation and classification. Given the 
limited degree of automation in the decision making process, it can 
be argued that these steps correspond to levels 0-2, in the SAE 
taxonomy mentioned above. In other words, the algorithm has to 
first understand how many objects exist in its view and then classify 
them into pedestrians, cars, traffic lights etc. This means that the 
algorithm has to boost interesting parts of the image over not so 
interesting ones; for example, be able to distinguish between a 
pedestrian standing next to a still or obscure background, e.g. a 
traffic light at a crossing or in a pavement with low lighting. 
Segmentation is then carried out using some sensors (cameras, 
lasers etc.) that should be able to learn new environments in an 
unsupervised way (Levinson, J., & Thrun, S., 2014).  In this 
context, recognition and classification of human and objects in the 
car’s proximity might go beyond simple processing of visual input 
through the car’s camera and applying labels to objects using a 
database stored in the car: they might require autonomous 
interactions with electronic systems and databases outside the 
vehicle like GPS-based guidance systems and information from the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) that would allow the 
algorithm to localize the vehicle and its neighboring objects and 
surroundings (Zhu,J., et al., 2014). Furthermore, information about 
the car’s location and other parameters (speed, direction etc.) 
should be passed on to a central (global) guidance system and 
database at a remote location, e.g. DOT so that other (neighboring) 
vehicles might be informed about the car’s trajectory and 
parameters.  
Operations (iv)-(vi) above are more complicated and as such, 
correspond to SAE levels 3 – 5 (see Figure 1 above): on top of 
image processing and computer vision tasks, the algorithm of the 
driverless car has to solve an inherently dynamic problem where on 
top of image processing the algorithm has also to predict 
trajectories in time, both its own and neighboring cars e.g. predict 
the future location of the car in the front given its speed to avoid 
collision in case it breaks unexpectedly. It also has to generate 
appropriate steering commands, breaking, acceleration and  be able 
to associate past and future driving conditions, e.g. if the ground 
map includes information about a congested road coming up the 
algorithm could look for alternative routes or try to slow down even 
though obstacles might not be directly visible. All these operations 
endow the algorithm with a novel sense of agency as it effectively 
acts in lieu of a driver and behaves like one. What are the criteria 
for legally assessing this new sort of agency?   
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This question does not suggest that automated vehicles operate 
on a legal vacuum. On the contrary, the issue of liability has been 
debated many times at a national, federal and international level 
and although incoherent, most solutions suggested in the regulatory 
domain move towards strict liability. Given however the different 
types of driverless cars (reflecting various shades of automation), 
there is no size that fits all:  Volvo, for instance has declared that 
the company will pay for any damages caused by its fully 
autonomous IntelliSafe Autopilot system. With regards to Google’s 
car, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
has recognized that the software, not the human, is the driver. At 
the same time though, the international Vienna Convention on 
Road Traffic gives responsibility for the car to the driver, requiring 
that “[e]very driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle”. 
The amendment to Vienna Convention, which came into effect in 
2016, to include article 8 paragraph 5bis VC, does little in clarifying 
matters regarding autonomous vehicles: as it is premised on the 
assumption that such automated systems can be overridden by the 
driver, it does not take into account fully automated systems. Far 
from establishing legal certainty, the current regulative framework 
regarding automated vehicles is still dispersed and in working 
progress. At the same time, the issue of agency is barely addressed, 
mainly due to the challenging issue of proving actual causation in 
automated technology (Wittenberg, 2016). Next, follows an 
attempt to understand the agent’s artificial “intelligence” through 
the lens of personhood – a doctrinal approach beyond the strict 
confines of liability.   
 
4 Deep Learning Conundrums: The Emergence of 
“Assimilated Personhood” in ADM Algorithms. 
 
At this point, let us pause for an intermediate summary: so far, 
we have attempted to provide a descriptive (section 2) and 
normative analysis (section 3) of machine learning algorithms. 
These analyses have validated the hypothesis set out in the 
introduction, that ADM  is a challenging concept for law because it 
rests on  both the artefact’s pedigree (see section 2) and the 
artefact’s behavior (see section 3). These are two separate yet 
intertwined elements in the process of mimicking human behavior. 
In the case of driverless cars considered above, it was shown how 
human behavior reinforces the artefact’s pedigree, while at the 
same time the artefact’s behavior can occur without any human 
involvement.   
Therein lies the heart of the argument put forth here: the 
understanding of what robotic “intelligence” is by legal scholars is 
often limited; to this shortcoming one should add the increased 
complexity of modern techniques like RL and deep algorithms in 
AI that lead to a difficult conundrum; importantly, this conundrum 
cannot be addressed purely with metaphors as it is often the case 
for other questions that are new to legal research (Calo 2016). 
Earlier, we considered different levels of automation in machine 
learning algorithms and different shades of human agency inbuilt 
in systems using deep learning. This led us to conclude that tools 
for legal assessment that are currently available (e.g. Vienna 
Convention) are expected to be unable to capture the different 
levels of automation and human-machine interaction. For example, 
RL is often characterized by an opaque mechanism of decision 
making: although RL robots bear anthropomorphic features, it is 
still not clear to the lawmaker how to deal with this emergent 
concept of “assimilated personhood”. In this final part, the paper 
explores the necessity for a new concept of personhood together 
with algorithmic transparency in ADM and attempts to show how 
modern machine learning algorithms like RL present us with new 
challenges that require novel sets of standards.  
  
4.1. Artificial Personhood v. Simulated 
Personhood: Focusing on “the loop”  
 
 (Gray 1921) defined personhood as the quality of any entity 
possessing “intelligence and will”.  The idea that AI systems should 
be given entitlements to personhood is hardly a new one: there is 
already rich literature (Allan and Widdison, 1996; Kerr and Millar, 
2001; Chopra and White, 2011) that suggests that autonomous 
artificial agents could potentially be considered as entities meriting 
“legal” personhood.   
This is not the first time that entities other than a person are 
entitled to the responsibilities and rights associated with the notion 
of personhood. The concept of a “fictitious” notion of personhood 
applying to entities other than human individuals has long been 
supported by many famous jurists such as Von Savigny and 
Blackstone (Dewey, 1925), and accounts for the nature of an 
artificial personality reserved for corporations (Hallis,1930), which 
is now embraced in most legal systems. Not surprisingly, this finds 
its roots in the Roman law tradition, where the doctrine of “persona 
ficta”, served the purpose of distinguishing monks to monasteries 
in canon law, avoiding thereby any structural deficiencies of the 
latter: lacking in soul but made of individuals, who could still be 
held guilty of delict.  
 In the early 19th century, the US Supreme Court in Dartmouth 
described corporations as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of the law”, which displays in 
fact certain personhood virtues, not as a person but as a “mere 
creature of law.” (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 
636 (1819). Since then, modern corporate law has developed a 
more nuanced approach, acknowledging that these entities - being 
the creation of private initiative and market forces- incorporate 
competing interests that need to be accounted for (Kaeb 2015). In 
a similar vein, robots and artificial agents are highly automated 
systems that are equally premised on “private initiative and market 
forces” and would therefore fit the criteria of “legal personhood” as 
such. In the era of algorithms being the driving force behind 
unmanned systems that could inflict harm, like military drones,  it 
is imperative not to afford them “the blessings of perpetual life and 
limited liability” (Rehnquist dissenting in Pellotti with regard to 
banking corporations).  
 This proposition has of course not gone without criticism: 
automated systems cannot experience life as a good to itself given 
their lack of consciousness (Aleksander 1994; Franklin 1995) and 
would fall beyond the strict confinements of liability as a 
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punishment aiming at deterrence (Bentham, 2009). Such arguments 
however oversimplify the way in which automated systems operate 
and do not carefully consider the various levels of automation, as 
described above. Solum (1992) has therefore disregarded these 
claims as purely “behavioristic approaches” and has urged for a 
distinction between simulated and artificial intelligence. This 
would be a good first step towards addressing some of the most 
complicated regulatory problems posed by AI: limited 
foreseeability of actions, operations based on a highly 
compartmentalized and opaque design, and a narrow scope of 
controlled tasks, are only a few examples that demonstrate the need 
to fully grasp the contours of “intelligence” in AI (Scherer, 2016).  
  
4.2. The “Intelligence and Will” in Deep 
Learning: An Interpretation of Opacity   
  
We saw earlier, that deep learning algorithms for ADM have an 
intricate architecture, are often opaque and allow for various levels 
of human-machine interaction and autonomy. In other words, they 
are much more complex and less transparent than earlier rule- based 
algorithms, however, this additional complexity has not adequately 
been taken into account in their legal assessment to date. We also 
suggested that such intricacies render the understanding the concept 
of “personhood” associated with ADM algorithms problematic.    
Previously, we associated personhood with any entity 
possessing “intelligence and will”. A highly sophisticated and 
automated system can be considered to possess “personhood” but 
in what ways is the system “intelligent” and has “will”? 
Furthermore, the system was designed by a programmer and might 
sometimes be influenced by the user. Both the programmer and the 
user have their one distinct “personhoods”, so how do they interfere 
with the “system’s personhood”?  
We here propose that to address the above difficult questions 
one needs to  adopt a legal approach that will focus on both what 
the infrastructure and behavior of the automated system is and what 
the role of  the human element (programmer, user) might be, see 
also (Jones, 2015). This means that one needs to go beyond older 
approaches that put too much emphasis on how (i) efficient   (cf 
Citron, 2007) and  (ii) objective the algorithm is (Zarsky, 2015) 
without at the same time considering what the potential role of the 
human influence might be. As we saw earlier, this influence can be 
important for the algorithms output; for example, it might introduce 
biases in the outputs of the automated decision process.   
Dissecting the role of the human element is not an easy task, 
because, as we saw earlier, human influence might be hidden 
behind opaque architectures of the sort used in deep learning or 
might be indirect in the case of human-in-the-loop applications.  
This might be important for the correct legal assessment of liability 
and similar issues in modern ADM: if one neglects the influence of 
the programmer or operator, she runs the chance of not correctly 
attributing to humans flaws in the ADM algorithms for which the 
humans should be held responsible. Of course, the opacity of the 
algorithms does not render this an easy task especially for legal 
scholars; however only by taking a deeper look into the ADM 
mechanics could we have any hope of properly understanding   
concepts like personhood and liability associated with highly 
automated systems.   
A good number of scholars (Pasquale, 2015; Citron and 
Pasquale, 2014; Crawford and Schultz, 2014; Zarsky, 2016) are 
currently focusing their critique towards the high levels of opacity 
and urge the law to “open the black box of algorithms” or even set 
up a body of independent auditors to carefully examine ADM 
(Sandvig et al., 2014). In section 2 above, we saw that one 
important aspect of this opacity that can perhaps be easily 
quantified is the “bias” introduced by the programmer to the ADM 
algorithm: this referred to some feature selection or similar process 
that crucially affects the output (decision) of the algorithm and 
which results from the programmer’s direct input at the stage of 
designing the algorithm. We agree with the aforementioned 
scholars about the need to restore transparency as a much needed 
ex post measure to eliminate bias and evaluate human involvement 
and liability. Yet, we will argue, opening the black box of 
algorithms only sees part of the picture when it comes to modern 
ADM algorithms as it merely focus on the algorithms’ design. On 
the other hand, the “intelligence and the will” of the algorithm 
cannot be disconnected from its performance after the design 
process (and training) has been finalized: for example, when the 
driverless car has to navigate in real world conditions and interact 
with human agents (imagine such a car navigating through a street 
filled with other cars driven by humans). At that moment, the 
algorithm has its own personhood, mimics human behavior and 
perhaps continuously interacts with humans like a normal person 
would do. All these are emergent normative features that should be 
taken into careful consideration during proper legal assessment of 
deep learning algorithms: we argue that understanding the 
mechanics of these algorithms at the stage (level) of their design is 
insufficient and should be supplemented by the study of what the 
overall scope of human involvement at all stages might be 
including training and unsupervised or semi –supervised 
performance. For example, consider a driverless car that is first 
trained in a racing track, then performs successfully in the highway 
and then is assisted by a human when navigating in narrower 
streets. Is it enough to merely study the technical details of the 
algorithms that are used and also try to embed morality in their 
design? We argue it is not, and suggest that the law should also 
attempt to define the “intelligence” or “smartness” (Hildenbrandt, 
2015) of the algorithm as well as how this is affected by the 
subsequent human influence (after the algorithm is designed and 
training has been completed).  
  
5   From the Imitation Game to the Voigt-Kampff 
Test - Towards an Updated Legal Understanding of 
Machine Intelligence and the Road Ahead 
  
This paper has attempted to provide a normative and legal 
grounding of the “intelligence” demonstrated in automated systems 
that rely on deep learning. This is highly relevant nowadays, as the 
technological advances in robotics and cognitive sciences have 
paved the way to more sophisticated systems that can act and in a 
completely autonomous manner. These systems demonstrate 
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remarkable abilities to mimic human behavior: this can be happen 
in such unprecedented ways that interactions between algorithms 
and humans can be quite difficult to predict, e.g. consider Microsoft 
2016’s apology on their official blog regarding their Chabot Tay, 
and its racist comments on Twitter. The law has therefore to 
inevitably adopt a new concept of personhood that will deal with 
behaviors of modern human-like agents. This concept should go 
beyond the scope of traditional (weak) AI and reconsider wha  
“personhood” might be; also, how personhood can be described 
when  human-like autonomous agents that act in an “intelligent” 
manner, learn and evolve on their own interact with humans in real 
world environments.   
This unavoidably takes us down the treacherous road of 
providing definitions of concepts like “intelligence”; a tedious task 
in itself due to the relativity the concept bears. A simple question 
that comes to mind when one first tries to define this concept is the 
following: is it a concept that can be understood in terms of a 
mechanism (or an algorithm) that generates certain (human-like) 
behaviors or is it a matter of a human perceiving an agent (a human 
or a machine) as intelligent? Although Turing’s original intention 
in ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ was to explore whether 
a computer can “imitate a brain” (Copeland, 2004), he  then 
admitted to be skeptical as to how  the intelligence of a machine 
was to be perceived: “The extent to which we regard something as 
behaving in an intelligent manner” he noted (Turing, 1950) “is 
determined as much by our own state of mind and training as by 
the properties of the object under consideration” (see also Minsky, 
1988 for a similar view). In other words, Turing suggests that 
“intelligence” relates to how we perceive it in a manner remarkably 
similar to how the legal system operates: Turing’s “perception” of 
intelligence is akin to the principle of “interpretation”. The legal 
system tries to interpret human behaviors not to understand the 
mechanisms (algorithms) that might have generated them; this 
might be one reason why automated systems are not easily 
perceived in law and humanities in general. To address these 
shortcomings, theorists have sought to elucidate additional 
dimensions of machine intelligence, like consciousness (Floridi, 
2005), along the same lines of the empathy test employed in Philip 
Dick’s fictitious Voigt-Kampff test (Dick, 1968). Whereas 
intelligent processing shall always be opaque, it is desirable to go 
past the prima facie anthropomorphism of automated systems and 
actually enhance our understanding of what their “intelligence” 
might be. Deep Learning for instance, might yield results that even 
the programmers cannot anticipate. We therefore suggest that our 
perception of machine intelligence should be enhanced; this could 
either happen ex ante (“at the input stage”) or ex post (“at the output 
stage”):  
  
(i) ex ante efforts could include monitoring or prescribing the 
algorithm’s design features and principles e.g. carefully 
selecting training data or initial weights so that they are 
consistent with legal or ethical constraints (Wallach and 
Allen, 2008). 
(ii)  ex post efforts on the other hand, refer mostly to the user’s 
interpretation and feedback after the algorithm has 
performed an intelligent function (taken a decision).  
 
In other words, we should be able to assess the system’s 
performance, i.e. the processing instead of simply reviewing the 
decision met. This is also important as it places ADM within the 
socio-legal context it belongs to. In this sense, it echoes Pagallo’s 
view that we need to deepen our understanding of how this 
interaction works in vivo rather than in vitro (Pagallo, 2016). 
Unlike Pagallo however, we suggest that instead of reserving de-
regulated zones to test these interactions, we might be able to assess 
risks (and thus draft secondary rules) based on the performance as 
a means and not as an end to regulating automata.  
Machine learning has reached such a sophisticated level that it 
could not only result in misrepresenting an automated system that 
passed  the Turing test as a human but importantly  escape liability 
due to the judiciary’s inability to attribute a concept of 
“personhood” to  the system (algorithm). What is suggested here is 
not that we put ourselves in the shoes of the designers or engineers 
to be able and understand a software agent’s action/result. It is 
rather a matter of perception of its capabilities and context, as a way 
of rationalizing “intelligence” in AI. This shall help us overcome 
the issue of unpredictability as “the overall interpretation of the 
SA’s behavior will be based upon the hypothesis that the SA is 
operating ‘‘rationally’’, by adopting determinations appropriate to 
the purposes assigned to it, on the basis of the information available 
to it, in the context in which it is going to operate, that is, such an 
interpretation will be based upon the intentional stance” (Sartor, 
2009).  
This paper has sought to explore the challenges put forth by the 
application of modern machine learning algorithms like deep 
networks and reinforcement learning in the area of Automated 
Decision Making (ADM), which merits further research and 
consideration. We hope that our findings shall mobilize legal 
scholars and ethicists to undertake the difficult task of further 
dissecting the emergent normative features associated with ADM 
in the not so distant future.  
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
We wish to thank the anonymous reviewers, as well as Roger 
Brownsword, for the useful feedback provided. Our thanks extend 
further to Roland Vogl and the CodeX group at Stanford Law 
School as well as to Helen Nissenbaum, Katherine Strandburg and 
the PRG community at the ILI, New York University, for providing 
us with a platform to discuss our findings. An extended version of 
this paper appears at the International Review for Law Computers 
and Technology – Special Issue 2/2017. Any errors or omissions 
remain the sole responsibility of the authors. 
 
ICAIL ’17, June 2017, London UK. A. Karanasiou et al. 
 
10 
 
REFERENCES 
Aleksander I. 1994. “Towards a Neural Model of Consciousness.” Proceedings 
ICANN 94. Berlin: Springer   
Allan, T., and R. Widdison. 1996. “Can computers make contracts?” Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology, no 9: 25–52.  
Atkins R. 2015. “Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: Introducing the future of 
mobility.” White Paper.  
Awasthi, P., Balcan, M. F., and K. Voevodski. (2014). “Local algorithms for 
interactive clustering.” ICML. 550-558.  
Bentham, J. 2009.  “Punishment and Deterrence.” In: Principled Sentencing: 
Readings on Theory and Policy, edited by von Hirsch, A., Ashworth, A., and J. 
Roberts. Oxford:Hart Publishing.  
Calo R. 2015. “Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw.”  California Law Review, no 
103: 513.  
Calo, R. 2016. “Robots in American Law”. University of Washington School of Law 
Research Paper, no 99.  
Chomsky, N. 1996. Powers and Prospects. London: Pluto Press.  
Chopra, S., and L. White. 2011. A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents. 
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. Citron, D. K. 2007 “Technological due 
process”. Washington U L Rev, 85: 1249-1313.  
Citron, D. K., and F. A. Pasquale. 2014. “The scored society: due process for 
automated predictions”. Washington Law Review, no 89.  
Crawford, K., and J. Schultz. 2014. “Big data and due process: Toward a framework 
to redress predictive privacy harms.” BCL Reviews, no 55: 93.  
Dewey, J., 1925. The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,Yale LJ 
35:655.  
Dick, Ph., 1968. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep. Bowling Green: Bowling 
Green.  
Endsley, M. R., and D.B. Kaber. 1999. “Level of automation effects on performance, 
situation awareness and workload in a dynamic control task.” Ergonomics 42(3): 462 
Fitts, P. 1951. “Human engineering for an effective air-navigation and traffic-control 
system.” Washington: National Research Council, Division of Anthropology and 
Psychology.  
Floridi, L. 2005. “Consciousness, agents and the knowledge game”. Minds and 
machines 15(3–4): 415– 444. Franklin, S. 1995. Artificial Minds. Boston, MA: MIT 
Press.   
Gray, J. 1921. The Nature and Sources of the Law. London: Macmillan. Hallis, F., 
1930. Corporate personality: a study in jurisprudence: Oxford University Press, H. 
Milford.  
Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press.   
Hildenbrandt, M. 2015. Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law. Cheltenham, 
UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.  
Holzinger, A. 2016. “Interactive machine learning for health informatics: when do 
we need the human-in-the-loop?” Brain Informatics, no 3:119-131.  
Copeland, J. 2014. The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, 
Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and Artificial Life. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Jones, M. 2015. “Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair 
Automation Practices Principles.” Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L., no 18: 77.  
Kaeb, C. 2015. “Putting the ‘Corporate’ back into corporate personhood.”  
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 35(3).  
Kerr I. 2001. “Ensuring the success of contract formation in agent mediated 
electronic commerce.” Electronic Commerce Research 1: 183–202.   
Kumar, D., Rai, C. S., and S. Kumar, S. 2010. “Analysis of unsupervised learning 
techniques for face recognition.”  International Journal of Imaging Systems and 
Technology, 20(3): 261-267.  
Levinson, J., and S. Thrun. 2014. “Unsupervised calibration for multi-beam lasers.” 
In: Experimental Robotics. Berlin: Springer.  
Levinson, J., Askeland, J., Becker, J., Dolson, J., Held, D., Kammel, S., and M. 
Sokolsky. 2011. “Towards fully autonomous driving: Systems and algorithms.” In: 
Intelligent Vehicles Symposium, IEEE.  
Minsky, M. 1988. The Society of Mind” London: Pan Books.  
Microsoft’s Official Blog.2016. “Learning from Tay’s Introduction.”  
http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/  
Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Rusu, A. A., Veness, J., Bellemare, M. G., 
and S. Petersen. 2015. “Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning.” 
Nature, 518 (7540), 529-533.  
Mohri, M., Rostamizadeh, A., & Talwalkar, A. (2012). Foundations of machine 
learning. MIT press.  
Moris, E. 2007. “From Horse Power to Horsepower.” Access Magazine 1(30).  
Nakajima, C., Pontil, M., Heisele, B., and T. Poggio. (2000). “People recognition in 
image sequences by supervised learning.” MIT Report. Cambridge MA, Center for 
Biological and Computational Learning.  
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.2008. “National Motor Vehicle 
Crash Causation Survey: Report to Congress.” 
http://www.nrdnhtsa.dot/gov/pubs/811059.pdf   
Pagallo, U, 2016. “Even Angels Need the Rules:AI, Roboethics, and the Law”, in 
Gal A. Kaminka et al. (eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 
IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp. 209-215.  
Parasuraman R, 1997. “Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse”, 
Human Factors 37 (2):230-253  
Pasquale, F. 2015. The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money 
and information. Harvard University Press.  
Perez, S (2016, March), “Microsoft Silences its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users 
teach it Racism”. https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-
ibot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-racism/ (retrieved 12/08/2016)  
Riley, V. 1989. “A general model of mixed-initiative human-machine systems.” 
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society, no 33: 124-128.  
Rosen, R. 2012. "Google's Self-Driving Cars: 300,000 Miles Logged, Not a Single 
Accident Under Computer Control." The Atlantic.  
Russell, S J. and P. Norvig. 2003. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
SAE International. 2014. Surface Vehicle Information Report, J3016: Taxonomy and 
Definitions for Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving 
Systems.   
Sandvig, C., et al. 2014. “Auditing algorithms: Research methods for detecting 
discrimination on internet platforms.” Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical 
Concerns into Productive Inquiry.  
Sartor. G. 2009. Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the 
intentionality of software agents. Artificial Intelligence and Law 17(4): 253–290 
Scherer, M. 2016. “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies” Harvard Journal of Law & Tech, Vol 29 (2):354,359. 
Sheridan, T. 1970. “On how often the supervisor should sample.” IEEE Transactions 
on Systems Science and Cybernetics. SSC-6: 140-145.  
Sheridan, T. (2000). “Function allocation: algorithm, alchemy of apostasy?” 
International Journal of Human Computer Studies 5(2):205.   
Sheridan, T. B., and W.L. Verplank. 1978. Human and computer control of undersea 
teleoperators. Arlington: Office of Naval Research.  
Silberg, G., Manassa, M., Everhart, K., Subramanian, D., Corley, M., Fraser, H., and 
V. Sinha. 2013. “Self-Driving Cars: Are We Ready.” White paper KPMG.  Spitzer, 
C R.1987. Digital Avionics Systems, Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice Hall.   
Solum, L. B. 1992. “Legal personhood for artificial intelligence.” North Carolina 
Law Review, no 70: 1231.  
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction (Vol. 
1, No. 1). Cambridge: MIT press.  
Teubner, G. 2007. “Rights of Non Humans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New 
Actors in Politics and Law.” In: Lecture delivered on 17th January 2007 – Max 
Weber Programme, European University Institute.  
Thompson J M. 1994. “Medical Decision Making and Automation”, in Mouloua, M. 
and Parasuraman, R. (eds) Human Performance in Automated Systems: Current 
Research and Trends, Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.  
Titiriga, R. 2016. “Autonomy of Military Robots: Assessing the Technical and Legal 
('Jus in Bello') Thresholds.” The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & 
Privacy Law 32(2): 57-88.  
Trimble, T. E., Bishop, R., Morgan, J. F., and M. Blanco. 2014. Human factors 
evaluation of level 2 and level 3 automated driving concepts: Past research, state of 
automation technology, and emerging system concepts. Report No. DOT HS 812 
043. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.  
Turing, A. 1950. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind, New Series, 59 
(236): 433-460.  
Urmson, C., Anhalt, J., Bagnell, D., Baker, C., Bittner, R., Clark, M. N., and M. 
Gittleman. 2008. Autonomous driving in urban environments: Boss and the urban 
challenge. Journal of Field Robotics 25(8): 425-466.  
Van Hasselt, H., Guez, A., and D. Silver. 2015. Deep reinforcement learning with 
double Q-learning. CoRR, abs/1509.06461.  
Wallach W, and Allen, C. 2008.  Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from 
Wrong, Oxford University Press.  
Wei, J., Snider, J. M., Kim, J., Dolan, J. M., Rajkumar, R., & Litkouhi, B. 2013. 
Towards a viable autonomous driving research platform. In: Intelligent Vehicles 
Symposium.  
Williams A., Oliver C., Aumer K. and Ch. Meyers. 2016. “Racial Microaggressions 
and perceptions of Internet memes.” Computers in Human Behavior 63: 424-432. 
Wilson, A., Fern, A., Ray, S., and P. Tadepalli. 2007. “Multi-task reinforcement 
learning: a hierarchical Bayesian approach.” In: Proceedings of the 24th international 
conference on Machine learning.   
Wittenberg, S. 2016. “Automated Vehicles: Strict Products Liability, Negligence 
Liability and Proliferation”, Illinois Business L J  
Zarsky, T. 2016. “The trouble with algorithmic decisions an analytic road map to 
examine efficiency and fairness in automated and opaque decision making.” Science, 
Technology & Human Values 41(1): 118-132.  
Zhu, J., Montemerlo, M. S., Urmson, C. P., and A. Chatham. 2014. U.S. Patent No. 
8,874,372. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  
  
 
